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AN ARCTIC RACE: HOW THE UNITED STATES’
FAILURE TO RATIFY THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT ITS
INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC
Marta Kolcz-Ryan∗

INTRODUCTION
The Arctic’s unfavorable weather and climate conditions have
produced one of the most inhospitable environments on Earth, which led to
a very limited presence of humans and an absence of sovereignty claims for
centuries.1 As global warming causes the polar icecaps to recede,
potentially oil-rich seabeds are being uncovered beneath the Arctic Ocean in
the rapidly navigable—and drillable—territory. According to the U.S.
Geological Survey estimations, the Arctic Ocean's seabed may hold vast
reserves of oil and natural gas—up to 25% of the world’s undiscovered
reserves.2
Not surprisingly, the recent discoveries sparked a new land rush of
claims in the Arctic region—the division of which will be governed by the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“the Convention”).3
Under the Convention, five nations—Canada, the United States, Russia,
Norway and Denmark—can claim the natural resources on, above, and
beneath the Arctic Ocean floor up to 200 miles from their shorelines.4 They
can also extend their claim up to 350 miles from shore for any area that is
proven to be a part of their continental shelf.5
Determination of who owns the Arctic Ocean and any resources that
might be found beneath those waters will have significant economic
implications. The U.S. Department of Energy predicts a decline in
∗

Student Author.
The Arctic “was the last habitable frontier of human coloni[z]ation.” G. Richard Scott et al.,
Physical Anthropology of the Arctic, in THE ARCTIC: ENVIRONMENT, PEOPLE, POLICY 339, 339 (Mark
Nuttall & Terry V. Callaghan eds., 2000). The lack of human presence was due in part to the
accessibility and in part due to harsh environmental conditions. Id.
2
The U.S. Geological Survey, 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural
Gas Assessed in the Arctic, (July 23, 2008), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=
1980&from=rss_home. Some experts are calling the region the next Saudi Arabia. Richard A. Lovett,
Arctic Oil Rush Sparks Battles over Seafloor, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Aug. 23, 2007,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/08/070823-arctic-oil.html.
3
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 137, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
4
Id. art. 76, ¶¶ 1, 3.
5
Id. art. 76, ¶ 5.
1
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petroleum reserves and, despite oil prices topping $146 in June 2008, the
demand for oil is growing.6 In addition to the vast mineral resources, the
unpredictability of the Persian Gulf region makes the Arctic region even
more attractive for exploitation. Russia and Norway have already submitted
their claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“the
Commission”), while Canada and Denmark are collecting evidence to
prepare their submissions in the near future.7 All of these nations can gain
considerable oil and gas resources as a result of the Convention.
However, one Arctic state has so far failed to join the race. Unlike
the other Arctic nations, the United States has not ratified the Convention.
Although the United States has complied voluntarily with the Convention,
the failure to ratify the Convention could foreclose its ability to tap into
potential energy resources.
This failure could prevent significant
contributions to American energy independence, and increase security
threats. Thus, the best way to guarantee access to the Arctic’s resources and
to protect other economic and non-economic interests is for the United
States to become a party to the Convention.
This comment discusses the United States’ interests in the Arctic
region and available methods of securing such interests. In part I, this
comment provides background information on the geography of the Arctic.
Part II reviews recent legal developments with respect to claims raised by
countries bordering the Arctic. Part III examines the legal regime governing
the use of the oceans and the relevant provisions of the Convention,
including sovereignty limits, deep seabed mining, and methods of dispute
resolution. Part IV evaluates the United States’ position with respect to
Arctic sovereignty. First, this section explores the reasons for failing to
ratify the Convention by the United States. Next, it analyzes the pros and
cons of ratifying the Convention as well as the pros and cons of maintaining
the status quo. It also analyzes whether customary law or a mini-treaty
could secure American interests in the Arctic region. Finally, this comment
concludes that diminishing natural resources and the high instability of
6
Michael Klare, As U.S. Energy Sources Decline, Caspian Sea Oil Won't Solve Supply Problem,
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS 1, Oct. 21, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/0510KlareTestimony.pdf
(“According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), total energy use in the United States grew by 16%
between 1990 and 2002, and is projected to grow by another 35 percent between 2002 and 2025. At the
same time, many other countries, both developed and developing, have also experienced an increased
need for energy, pushing total world energy use from 348 quadrillion BTUs in 1990 to a projected 645
quadrillion BTUs in 2025, an increase of 85 percent.”).
7
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the
Russian Federation, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm (last
visited Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Submission by Russia]; Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines:
Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the Kingdom of Norway, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Submission by
Norway].
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regions where such resources are still present stimulate the need of the
United States to ratify the Convention to preserve its right to influence the
Arctic’s future.
I. BACKGROUND
The Arctic is the region around the Earth's North Pole, opposite the
Antarctic region around the South Pole.8 The Arctic includes the Arctic
Ocean (which overlies the North Pole), parts of Canada, Greenland, Russia,
the United States (Alaska), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland.9 The
Arctic Ocean is where experts anticipate the most conflict.10 Only there do
the borders of five nations—Russia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the
United States—meet. The three other Arctic nations, Iceland, Sweden and
Finland, do not have coasts on the Arctic Ocean.
There is no single and consistent definition of the Arctic.11 Often,
the Arctic is defined as “the cold polar region comprised of islands, oceans,
and land north of the Arctic Circle.”12
The size of the Arctic depends on its definition. According to the
botanical definitions of Bliss and Matayeva, the Arctic compromises 7.6
million km2.13 Most of the Arctic region consists of an ice-covered ocean
surrounded by treeless permafrost, which in many areas is more than 500
meters (about 1,500 feet) thick.14 The Arctic ice masses inhabit about 2.1
million km2 of the globe’s ice covered area, which is about 14% of the
worldwide total.15
A. Climate
The Arctic’s climate is distinguished by cold winters and cool
8
CIA, The World Factbook: Arctic Ocean, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/xq.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
9
Clifford Krauss et al., As Polar Ice Turns to Water, Dreams of Treasure Abound, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2005, at A1. The border line is generally considered to be “north of latitude 66.7° North where
the sun does not set below the horizon at midnight on midsummer’s night and does not rise above the
horizon at mid-day on mid-winter’s day.” Mark Nuttall & Terry V. Callaghan, Introduction, in THE
ARCTIC: ENVIRONMENT, PEOPLE, POLICY, supra note 1, at xxix.
10
Krauss et al., supra note 9. The Arctic Ocean is less than 1.5 the size of the U.S. which makes it
the smallest of the world’s oceans. The World Factbook, supra note 8. “[T]he ocean floor is about 50%
continental shelf (highest percentage of any ocean) with the remainder a central basin interrupted by
three submarine ridges (Alpha Cordillera, Nansen Cordillera, and Lomonosov Ridge).” Id.
11
Nuttall & Callaghan, supra note 9, at xxix.
12
Melissa A. Verhaag, It Is Not Too Late: The Need for a Comprehensive International Treaty to
Protect the Arctic Environment, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 555, 557-58 (2003).
13
Nuttall & Callaghan, supra note 9, at xxxi. According to the political definitions, arctic lands
comprise 7.6 km2 and the oceans 14 km2. Id.
14
Verhaag, supra note 12, at 559 (describing the Arctic as “a region based around an ocean
surrounded by continents”); Olav Orheim, Challenges and Prospects in the Arctic, 94 SCANDINAVIAN
REVIEW 26, 26 (2006) (noting that the Arctic is a region that is characterized by permafrost on land).
15
Martin J. Siegert & Julian A. Dowdeswell, Glaciology, in THE ARCTIC: ENVIRONMENT, PEOPLE,
POLICY, supra note 1, at 27.
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summers. Winter (January) temperatures at the North Pole average -30°C (22°F).16 Summer temperatures (from June until August) average around the
freezing point 0°C (32°F).17
In recent years, the effects of a global warming have also been
observed in the Arctic. Although the Arctic Ocean is now covered by the
ice year round, scientists predict that by 2050 it will likely be ice-free during
summer.18 Ironically, the global warming may have some positive
implications: the opening of the Arctic. The seasonal melting of the polar
cap could allow access to petroleum deposits and could cut sailing time
from Germany to Alaska by 60%, going through Russia’s Arctic instead of
the Panama Canal.19 Furthermore, a revived Northern sea route could
shorten the journey for cargo from Northeast Asia to Europe by 40%.20
B. Natural Resources
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the Arctic region is the
largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on earth.21 The
agency estimated that the Arctic may hold as much as ninety billion barrels
of undiscovered oil reserves, and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.22
This would amount to 13% of the world’s total undiscovered oil and about
30% of the undiscovered natural gas. With an average consumption rate of
eighty six million barrels per day, “the potential oil in the Arctic could meet
global demand for almost three years.”23 The Arctic’s potential natural gas
resources are three times bigger, which is equal to Russia’s gas reserves,
which are the world’s largest.24
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: TOPOGRAPHY OF THE CLAIMS
No country owns the North Pole or the region of the Arctic Ocean
surrounding it.25 The surrounding Arctic states, the United States, Canada,
Russia, Norway and Denmark (via Greenland), are limited to a 37016
NOAA, Frequently Asked Questions about the Arctic, http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/faq.html (last
visited Sept. 23, 2009).
17
NOAA, Daylight, Darkness and Changing of the Seasons at the North Pole,
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/gallery_np_seasons.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) (noting that the region
faces six months of constant sunlight and six months of total darkness); Orheim, supra note 14, at 26.
18
See Barry H. Dubner, On the Basis for Creation of a New Method of Defining International
Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, 13 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 19 (2005). If the ice were to melt,
the sea level would rise by approximately 6 meters. Seigert & Dowdeswell, supra note 15, at 28.
19
Doug Mellgren, Technology, Climate Change Spark Race to Claim Arctic Resources, USA
TODAY, Mar. 24, 2007.
20
Krauss et al., supra note 9.
21
The U.S. Geological Survey, supra note 2.
22
Id. The survey looked at “undiscovered, technically recoverable resources [,]” defined as
resources that can be produced using current technology. Id.
23
Jad Mouwad, Oil Survey Says Arctic Has Riches, N.Y TIMES, July 24, 2008, at C1.
24
Id.
25
See Durham University: International Boundaries Research Unit, Maritime Jurisdiction and
Boundaries in the Arctic Region, http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
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kilometer (200 nautical mile) economic zone around their coasts.26 Upon
ratification of the Convention, a country has ten years to make claims to
extend its 200-mile zone.27 Four out of the five Arctic nations have already
ratified the Convention: Norway (1996), Russia (1997), Canada (2003), and
Denmark (2004).28 The following section describes each country’s
undertaking to establish claims that certain Arctic sectors should belong to
its territories.
A. Russia
On December 20, 2001, Russia made a submission through the
Secretary General to the Commission, in accordance with the Convention
(article 76, paragraph 8), in which it proposed to establish new outer limits
of its continental shelf beyond the previous 200 nautical mile zone.29 In the
submission, Russia claimed the Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, the Sea of
Okhotsk, and the Central Arctic Ocean.30 On October 8, 2002, the
Commission considered Russia’s submission and recommended the
following: “As regards the Central Arctic Ocean . . . the Russian Federation
[should] make a revised submission in respect of its extended continental
shelf in that area based on the findings contained in the recommendations.”31
The failed attempt to extend its continental shelf in 2001 led to the
2007 expedition of two Russian mini-subs in search of more evidence that
would support Russia’s right to extend its Northern borders. The subs made
an eight-hour dive beneath the North Pole, took water and soil samples, and
planted a titanium Russian flag on the seabed.32 The expedition provoked a
hostile reaction from other Arctic nations.33 The expedition made acoustic
scans of the Arctic seabed and alleged that they have found an underwater
ridge linking Russia to the North Pole, the Lomonosov Ridge.34 According
26

UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 76, ¶ 5.
Id. annex II, art. 4.
28
UN Office of Legal Affairs, Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists
of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#. The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (last visited Sept. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Lists].
29
Submission by Russia, supra note 7.
30
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Oceans and the Law of the Sea,
9-10, U.N. Doc. A/57/57/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N02/276/17/PDF/N0227617.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter Report].
31
Id. at 10.
32
Paul Reynolds, Trying to Head off an Arctic 'Gold Rush', May 29, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/low/in_depth/7423787.stm. In response to the Russian expedition, Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister
announced that “[t]hey’re fooling themselves if they think dropping a flag on the ocean floor is going to
change anything. There is no question over Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic . . . . You can't go around
the world these days dropping a flag somewhere. This isn't the 14th or 15th century.” Id.
33
Shamil Midkhatovich Yenikeyeff & Timothy Fenton Krysiek, The Battle for the Next Energy
Frontier: The Russian Polar Expedition and the Future of Arctic Hydrocarbons, OXFORD INST. FOR
ENERGY STUD., Aug. 2007, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0807-3.pdf.
34
Rebeccah Billing, Russia Prepares Claim to the Arctic Shelf, THE MOSCOW NEWS, Oct. 7, 2008,
http://www.mnweekly.ru/business/20080710/55337256.html.
27
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to experts, the ridge has ten billion tons of gas and oil deposits and
significant sources of diamonds, gold, tin, manganese, nickel, lead and
platinum.35
During a press conference on October 7, 2008, State Duma member
Artur Chilingarov announced that based on the evidence from the 2007
expedition, Russia is preparing to submit a new application to extend its
borders over 1.2 million km2 of the Arctic waters.36 The claim will be
presented to the Commission during its next assembly in 2009. The claim,
if successful, could give Russia the right to a projected ten billion metric
tons of hydrocarbons buried under the Arctic Ocean seafloor.37
B. Canada
Since 1925, Canada has claimed the portion of the Arctic between
60°W and 141°W longitude, extending to the North Pole, including all
islands in this region as well as the territorial waters surrounding these
islands.38 In addition, Canada asserts control of the Northern Passage.39
Canada claims that the Arctic waters of the Northern Passage constitute
internal waters under historic title. The claim has been disputed by the
European Union and the United States, which claim that the Northern
Passage constitutes international waters.40 Recently, Canada’s prime
minister moved to firm up control of disputed Arctic waters by announcing
stricter registration requirements for ships sailing in the Northern Passage.41
Under the new regime, “all ships sailing into the Canadian Arctic will be
required to report to NORDREG, the Canadian Coast Guard agency that
tracks vessels on such journeys,” a process which used to be voluntary.42
Canada also seeks to extend the outer limits of its continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles in accordance with article 76 of the Convention,
through the submission of its claim to the Commission by the end of 2013.43
35
Will Stewart, Putin’s Arctic Invasion: Fears as Russia Claims Undersea Oil Zone the Size of
Five Britains, DAILY MAIL, June 29, 2007, § 1, at 21.
36
Billing, supra note 34.
37
Id.
38
National Resources Canada, The Atlas of Canada, http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca/site/english/maps/
historical/territorialevolution/1927/1 (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
39
ROBERT DUFRESNE, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, CONTROVERSIAL CANADIAN CLAIMS OVER
ARCTIC WATERS AND MARITIME ZONES, PARLIAMENTARY INFO. & RES. SERVICE 1 (2008), http://www.
parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0747-e.pdf (noting that “the Northwest Passage is unusual in
the sense that it is not a fixed geographical location, but rather a water route. It connects the Davis Strait
and Baffin Bay in the east to the Bering Strait in the west.”).
40
Id. at 5-6.
41
The Torch, Strengthening Canada's Claim to Maritime Arctic Sovereignty, http://
toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2008/08/strengthening-canadas-claim-to-maritime.html (last visited
Sept. 28, 2009).
42
Id.
43
UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 76, § 1; Eduard Gismatullin, Canada Will Claim Arctic Shelf in
2013, NAT’L POST, July 3, 2008, available at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=
629710.
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In the eastern part of the Arctic, Canada joined forces with Denmark to
conduct an expedition aimed at finding evidence establishing that the
Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of Canada’s and Denmark’s continental
shelf.44
The early findings from a joint Canadian-Danish study of the
Lomonosov Ridge are “very positive” for Canada’s case, and according to
the scientists, the seafloor at the pole could eventually be ruled part of
Canada’s territory.45 Canada’s claim includes an area of ocean floor
stretching to the North Pole that would be the equivalent in size to the three
Prairie Provinces combined.46
C. Norway
The Convention entered into force in Norway on July 24, 1996.47
On November 27, 2006, Norway made an official submission to the
Commission to extend its continental shelf in three areas of the northeastern
Atlantic and the Arctic: the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea, the Western
Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean, and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian
Sea.48 The submission also states that an additional submission for
continental shelf limits in other areas may be posted later.
During the 21st session, the Commission posed a series of questions
to the delegation of Norway and “informed the delegation about its
preliminary views with regard to certain areas of the submission and about
its future programme [sic] of work.”49 Currently, the Commission still
continues to analyze the data contained in Norway’s submission.50
D. Denmark
As noted above, Denmark ratified the Convention in 2004. It has
yet to make a submission to the Commission to secure its jurisdiction over
large swaths of the Arctic Ocean seafloor adjacent to its coastlines. In June
2006, Denmark and Canada conducted a joint surveying project of
44
Gismatullin, supra note 43. In the western part of the Arctic, Canada is gathering data with a
view to a future submission to the Commission. Id.
45
Randy Boswell, Study Bolsters Canada's Arctic Sea Claim, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE, May 26,
2008, http://www2.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=eeb8f3ca-d994-4e41-b19adbd30df9c165. The challenge, according to Jacob Verhoef, Halifax-based director of the Geological
Survey of Canada’s Atlantic division, “is to first demonstrate ‘whether the Lomonosov Ridge is attached’
to the North American continent and then -- in followup studies to be completed by 2011 -- to determine
how far north from the Canadian coast the attachment holds.” Id.
46
Id.
47
Submissions by Norway, supra note 7.
48
Id.
49
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Commission on the Continental Shelf, Statement of the
Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the
Commission, ¶ 27, CLCS/58 (April 25, 2008). The proceedings of the Commission are confidential. Id.
¶ 36.
50
Id. ¶ 4h. The 21st session was held from March 17 through April 18 of 2008. Id. ¶ 1.
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unexplored parts of the Arctic Ocean near their coasts in search of scientific
evidence proving the claimed undersea territories are linked geologically to
their mainland or Arctic islands.51
Denmark is interested in proving that the Lomonosov Ridge is
linked geologically to Greenland (a Danish autonomous province), which
has the nearest coastline to the North Pole. The Danish claim is opposed by
Russia, which claims that the Ridge is an extension of Siberia. If Denmark
succeeds in establishing such a link it could extend its territory 350 nautical
miles or further.52
Because Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark have ratified the
Convention, they can take advantage of procedural and substantive rights
contained in the Convention (while the United States cannot take advantage
of such rights until it ratifies the Convention). With countries competing for
control of the Arctic, the applicable law governing the opposing claims is of
great importance.
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Throughout history humans have been long dependent on free
access to the oceans and their resources.53 Nations’ competing claims to the
oceans have led to the development of customary laws such as the “freedom
of the seas” doctrine and most recently the Convention—a treaty regulating
all matters related to the law of the sea.
A. The Old Law of the Seas
Since the early seventeenth century, a nation’s right to resources
contained in the sea waters was governed by the “freedom of the seas”
doctrine.54 According to the doctrine, a nation’s rights and jurisdiction was
limited to a narrow area of sea along the nation’s shoreline.55 What was left
of the oceans was considered to be common property that belonged to
everyone, and which could be used by anyone.
The United States was the first nation to deviate from the freedom
51
Stephen Leahy, Arctic: Canada and Denmark Revive Sovereignty Claims, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Apr. 22, 2006, available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32979.
52
MINISTRY OF SCIENCE, TECH. AND INNOVATION, FIELDWORK DURING APRIL/MAY 2006 NORTH
OF CAN./GREEN., http://a76.dk/expeditions_uk/lorita-1_uk/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009)
(Den.); Julian Coman, Denmark Causes International Chill by Claiming North Pole, TELEGRAPH, Oct.
17, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1474377/Denmark-causes-international-chill-byclaiming-North-Pole.html (“There is a chance that the North Pole could become Danish . . . .”).
53
See SCOTT G. BORGERSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA, Council Spec. Rep. No. 46, at 14 (May 2009), http://www.cfr.org/content/
publications/attachments/LawoftheSea_CSR46.pdf (discussing importance of oceans to U.S. interests).
54
Stephanie Holmes, Comment, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty, 9
CHI. J. INT’L L. 323, 327 (2008).
55
Geology.com, Who Owns the Arctic, http://geology.com/articles/who-owns-the-arctic.shtml (last
visited Oct. 5, 2009).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss1/9

2009]

AN ARCTIC RACE

157

of the seas doctrine. In 1945, President Harry S. Truman announced that the
United States assumed jurisdiction of all natural resources out to the edge of
its continental shelf.56 Quickly other nations followed with claims to
seafloor resources, fishing grounds, and exclusive navigable zones.57
Spreading water pollution, overfishing, competing demands to the resources,
and territorial disputes dominated the second half of the twentieth century,
“threatening to transform the oceans into another arena for conflict and
instability.”58 It became clear that the world was in need of a new treaty to
bring order to the world’s oceans, their uses, and their resources.
In 1982, as a result of more than fourteen years of work and
participation by more than 150 countries representing all regions of the
world, the Convention known as “the Law of the Sea” was presented.59 The
Convention encompassed traditional rules governing “the uses of the oceans
and at the same time introduced new legal concepts and regimes and
addressed new concerns.”60 The full text of the Convention consists of 320
articles and nine annexes, and addresses the following aspects of ocean
territory: “delimitation, environmental control, marine scientific research,
economic and commercial activities, transfer of technology and the
settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters.”61
B. The Key Provisions of the Convention
Some of the key features of the Convention include the sovereignty
provisions, which define areas of the oceans where coastal states may
exercise sovereignty; the seabed mining provisions, which regulate the uses
of the ocean floor; and the resolution of disputes provisions, which establish
dispute and settlement methods.
The Convention was adopted as a “package” and “integral whole,”
and therefore it must be accepted or rejected by its signatories in its

56

Holmes, supra note 54, at 327.
BORGERSON, supra note 53, at 7. Shortly after, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, declared seaward
extensions of their jurisdictions to two hundred miles encompassing fisheries for species such as tuna.
Id. Such unilateral declaration caused “international conflict that continued into the mid-1970s in the
form of the repeated seizure, particularly by Ecuador, of ships of the U.S. tuna fleet based in San Diego
found within the declared two-hundred-mile limit but well outside the traditional three-mile territorial
sea.” Id.
58
UN Office of Legal Affairs, Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Historical%20Perspective (last visited Sept. 30,
2009) [hereinafter UNCLOS Historical Perspective].
59
UN Office of Legal Affairs, Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (Overview), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) [hereinafter
UNCLOS Overview].
60
Id.
61
Id.
57
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totality.62 “Ratification of, or accession to, the Convention expresses the
consent of a State to be bound by its provisions” and includes an
undertaking not to take any action that could defeat the Convention’s
objectives and purposes.63
1. The Sovereignty Provisions
The Convention established that “coastal States exercise sovereignty
over their territorial sea . . . up to a limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles.”64
However, foreign ships are allowed “innocent passage” through such
territorial seas. In addition, the Convention provides that each country has
“sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and
exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental
protection.”65 The Convention grants to other nations freedom of navigation
and overflight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and
pipelines. In addition, “land-locked and geographically disadvantaged
States have the right to participate on an equitable basis in exploitation of an
appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the EEZ's of coastal
States of the same region or sub-region.”66
Furthermore, under article 76 a nation may expand its EEZ if it can
convince the Commission67 that there is a “natural prolongation” of its
continental shelf beyond that limit.68 The continental shelf is defined as “the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial
sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge
of the continental margin . . . .”69 If the continental shelf extends beyond

62

Statement by Tommy T.B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, in 1 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982 11, 12 (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1985); Hasjim Djalal, The
Effects of the Law of the Sea Convention on the Norms That Now Govern Ocean Activities, in
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 50, 54
(Jon M. Van Dyke ed., 1985) [hereinafter CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION] (stating that in addition,
the signatory states may choose not to grant specific rights or privileges in the Convention to nonsignatory states).
63
UNCLOS Historical Perspective, supra note 58.
64
UNCLOS Overview, supra note 59.
65
Id. Two hundred nautical miles equals 230 miles or 371 kilometers.
66
Id.
67
Annex II requires that the Commission is composed of 21 experts in the field of geology,
geophysics, or hydrography, appointed by countries that ratified the treaty from among their nationals,
“having due regard to the need to ensure equitable geographic representation . . . .” UNCLOS, supra
note 3, annex II, art. 2, ¶ 1. The Commission has to provide the member states with scientific and
technical advice on information gathering, and give recommendations on their territorial claims.
UNCLOS, supra note 3, annex II, art. 3, ¶ 1.
68
UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 76, ¶ 1. “Coastal States share with the international community part
of the revenue derived from exploiting resources from any part of their shelf beyond 200 miles.”
UNCLOS Overview, supra note 59.
69
UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 76, ¶ 1. Usually, the shelf is a shallow extension of a landmass
which drops into the oceanic abyss. But in many places, the drop-off is connected to long-submerged
ridges that, if precisely mapped, might add thousands of square miles to a country's exploitable seabed.
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200 nautical miles, nations may claim jurisdiction up to 350 nautical miles
from the baseline or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meter depth,
depending on certain criteria such as the thickness of sedimentary deposits.70
The limits of the shelf established by a country pursuant to
recommendations of the Commission are final and binding upon other
countries.71
2. The Seabed Mining Provisions
The Convention states that mineral resources beyond national
jurisdiction are the “Common Heritage of Mankind.”72 These resources are
managed by the International Seabed Authority (“ISA”). The ISA oversees
the exploration and exploitation of the seabed minerals in accordance with
Part XI of the Convention, its Annexes, and the 1994 Agreement of
Implementation.73 It has no other authority over uses of the oceans or over
other resources in the oceans.
The ISA includes an Assembly open to all parties and a thirty-six
member Council.74 The Council is the primary decision-making body, with
responsibility for giving practical effect to the requirement for nondiscriminatory access to deep seabed minerals and for adopting rules for
exploration and development.75 The ISA operates by contracting with
private and public corporations and other entities, authorizing them to
explore, and eventually exploit, specified areas on the deep seabed for
mineral resources. The Convention also established a body called the
Enterprise which is to serve as the ISA’s own mining operator, but no
concrete steps have been taken to implement this provision.76
3. The Resolution of Disputes Provisions
Signatories of the Convention are required to resolve, by peaceful
means, their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention.77 Disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea established under the Convention, to the International

Office of Naval Research, Ocean Regions: Ocean Floor - Continental Margin & Rise, http://www.onr.
navy.mil/focus/ocean/regions/oceanfloor2.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
70
UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 76, ¶ 5.
71
Id. ¶ 8.
72
Id. art. 136.
73
See generally UN Office of Legal Affairs, Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/
closindxAgree.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
74
UNCLOS, supra note 3, arts. 159 ¶ 1, 161 ¶ 1.
75
Id. arts. 152 ¶ 1, 162 ¶ 1.
76
Id. art. 170, ¶ 2.
77
Id. arts. 279-80.
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Court of Justice, or to arbitration.78 Conciliation is also available and, in
certain circumstances, submission to it would be compulsory.79 Article
287(3) provides that a state party that does not make a specific declaration is
deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII. In
addition, nations may opt out of methods of resolution provided by the
Convention for different categories of disputes, including disputes about
boundaries and the continental shelf.80
IV. FUTURE: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RATIFY THE CONVENTION?
The Convention has been ratified by 159 countries and is widely
accepted as a valid treaty controlling the use of the oceans.81 The United
States is one of the countries that has failed so far to ratify the Convention.
This section will analyze the United States’ position in regards to the
Convention. It examines the historical reasons for failing to ratify the
Convention and the arguments raised by the opponents of U.S. accession. It
also examines whether customary law or a mini-treaty could secure the
American interest in the Arctic. Finally, this section considers how the
Convention advances various American interests in the Arctic including
economic interests, security interests, and peaceful resolution of disputes.
A. History: Why the United States Has Thus Far Failed to Ratify the
Convention
Recognizing the need for “a comprehensive treaty that would clarify
and bring certainty to the many ocean issues that had divided nations over
the years,” the United States sent the largest delegation to negotiate the
Convention.82 After the Convention became open for signature on
December 10, 1982, President Reagan announced that the Convention
articulates “traditional uses of the oceans which generally confirm existing
maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states.”83 In
addition, he declared that the United States would recognize the following
principles expressed in the Convention:
1. The United States would “recognize the rights of other
states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the
convention”;
2. The United States would exercise “its navigation and
78

UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 287, ¶¶ 4-5. The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over deep
seabed mining disputes. Id. art. 288, ¶ 3.
79
Id. art. 284, ¶ 1.
80
Id. art. 298, ¶ 1. Canada, Denmark and Russia took advantage of article 298 and opted out of the
dispute resolution procedures provided for under the Convention. Holmes, supra note 54, at 337.
81
See Lists, supra note 28.
82
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 1.
83
United States Oceans Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983) [hereinafter
Policy Statement].
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overflight rights and freedoms . . . in a manner that is
consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the
convention”; and
3. The United States would “exercise sovereign rights in
living and nonliving resources within 200 nautical miles of
its coast” in accordance with the EEZ provisions.84
Nevertheless, President Reagan refused to ratify the Convention
because of the seabed mining provisions (Part XI). According to President
Reagan, the seabed mining provisions in the Convention would have to be
corrected to achieve a treaty that would assure access to seabed mineral
resources, avoid monopolization of resources by the ISA, disallow
amendments without parties’ approval, and eliminate the requirement of
technology transfers to other nations.85 Despite rejecting Part XI of the
Convention, President Reagan nevertheless ordered government agencies to
comply with the remaining provisions of the Convention, and as a result,
each succeeding administration has complied with the laws prescribed by
the Convention.86
Subsequently, a group of negotiators led by the United States was
able to bargain changes to the controversial deep seabed mining
provisions.87 After this agreement was reached, President Bill Clinton
signed the Convention in 1994 and submitted it to the Senate for its
ratification. However, a group of senators led by Jesse Helms managed to
block the ratification of the Convention.88
In February, 2002, President Bush designated the Convention as of
one of the five treaties for which there was urgent need for Senate
approval.89 Under the new chairmanship of Senator Richard Lugar, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee finally held hearings on the
Convention in 2003 and 2004.90 President Bush and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee unanimously approved the Convention; however
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist refused to schedule a vote, claiming that
there was an “inadequate understanding of what the Law of the Sea Treaty

84

Id.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 887 (July 9, 1982). The
International Seabed Authority was described as “nothing less than a new Socialist international
economic order . . . .” CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 83.
86
Policy Statement, supra note 83.
87
David B. Sandalow, Law of the Sea Convention: Should the U.S. Join?, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION POL’Y BRIEF # 137, Aug. 2004, at 2, available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2004/
08energy_sandalow.aspx.
88
Don Kraus, Time to Ratify the Law of the Sea, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, June 6, 2007,
http://fpif.org/pdf/gac/0706sea.pdf.
89
Sandalow, supra note 87, at 8.
90
Id. at 1-2.
85
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actually is.”91
Recently, President Bush again publicly insisted on the Senate to
“act favorably on U.S. accession” to the Convention.92 Shortly after the
President’s recommendation, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on the Convention.93 During the hearings before the Committee,
Deputy Secretary John D. Negroponte warned members of the Committee:
“We must join the Law of the Sea Convention, and join it now, to take full
advantage of the many benefits it offers the United States and to avoid the
increasing cost of being a non-party.”94 There was little doubt that if the
Convention was put to a vote, the Senate would give its advice and consent
to accession.95 Once again, however, the full Senate did not get the
opportunity to vote.96 Adversaries were yet again successful in keeping it
from reaching the Senate floor “by making it clear that a debate on U.S.
accession would trigger every possible procedural maneuver and thereby
take up maximum floor time.”97 The Senate Majority Leader decided not to
send the treaty forward under those circumstances, and “the treaty has
languished [once again] on the Senate calendar . . . .”98
In addition to the bipartisan support received from the past and
current administration, the Convention is widely supported by diverse
groups in the private sector including shipping, fishing, oil and natural gas,
drilling contractors, ship builders, telecommunications companies, several
important environmental organizations, and the oceanographic research

91
Robert B. Bluey, Should Senate Ratify Law of the Sea Treaty?, HUM. EVENTS, Feb. 7, 2005, at 3,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200502/ai_n9521991.
92
Statement on the Advancement of United States Maritime Interests, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 635 (May 15, 2007) [hereinafter Maritime Interests].
93
On October 31, 2007, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly approved the
Law of the Sea Convention, sending it to the full Senate for ratification. Richard G. Lugar, Law of the
Sea Clears Committee, http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/sea.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009). The vote was
17-4, without any amendments or new conditions. Id.
94
Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement
Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention: Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 4
(2007) (written testimony of John D. Negroponte, Deputy Sec’y U.S. Dep't of State), available at
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2007/NegroponteTestimony070927.pdf.
95
“The Committee report recommended that the full Senate give its advice and consent to the treaty
and set forth a set of declarations, understandings, and conditions that had been carefully worked out
between the Committee and the Executive Branch.” John B. Bellinger III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of
State, Remarks at the Berkley School of Law’s Law of the Sea Institute: The United States and The Law
of the Sea Convention (Nov. 3, 2008), http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2008/11/bellinger-united-states-andlaw-of-sea.html.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. With last November’s elections, according to some scholars, the shift of the political powers
makes the “prospects of Senate approval likely.” BORGERSON, supra note 53, at 3. Additionally, the
new administration including President Barack Obama and Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who was
chairman of the SFRC when the convention was last recommended for approval in 2007, strongly
support the Convention. Id. at 3-4. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton considers getting the convention
through the Senate to be her top priority for her State Department. Id. at 4.
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community.99
Although, the United States has acted for over twenty years in
accordance with the Convention, “[d]ue to other important business, it has
been easy to put consideration of the Convention off to the future.”100 Given
that the Convention has a wide and diverse group of supporters from the
public sector to private industry, military, and environmental organizations,
is there a persuasive argument why the United States should not ratify the
Convention? The following section will analyze the accuracy of arguments
that opponents of the Convention invoke to block the ratification of what
they believe is a “LOST” Convention.101
B. The Perceived Flaws of the Convention
While the Convention appears to be a widely supported agreement,
it has failed to receive consent of the Senate. The opposition has focused
mainly on a few “primarily ideological, objections to the Convention so as
to take advantage of several procedural customs within the Senate . . . .”102
The most often cited argument against ratifying the Convention involves the
surrender of U.S. sovereignty. However, as noted in section III, the
Convention actually expands the United States sovereignty rights. It grants
the United States exclusive rights to a twelve-mile territorial sea, a 200-mile
EEZ, and finally a possibility to extend its continental shelf up to 350
miles.103 This brings an additional 4.1 million miles2 of ocean under

99

Senator Richard G. Lugar, Opening Statement at the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/Lugar-27Sep07.pdf. Senator
Richard Lugar noted that “every major ocean industry, including shipping, fishing, oil and natural gas,
drilling contractors, ship builders, and telecommunication companies . . . supported U.S. accession to the
Law of the Sea and lobbyied in favor of it.” Id. Specifically, the Convention is supported by the
following organizations: American Petroleum Institute, American Chemistry Council, International
Association of Drilling Contractors, National Oceans Industries Association, National Marine
Manufacturers Association, Chamber of Shipping of America, U.S. Tuna Foundation, Western Pacific
Regional Fishery Management Council. The Convention is supported by the following environmental,
legal, naval, and research organizations: Navy League of the United States, Naval Reserve Association,
Transportation Institute, U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, Pew Oceans Commission, The Ocean
Conservancy Oceana, Center for International Environmental Law, IUCN/World Conservation Union,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Scenic America Environmental Defense, National Environmental
Trust, Physicians for Social Responsibility, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, League of Conservation
Voters, World Wildlife Fund, Humane Society of the United States, American Bar Association, Maritime
Law Association of the United States, Council on Ocean Law, U.S. Arctic Research Commission. S.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 108-10, at 7 (2004); Citizens for Global Solutions, The United States and the Law of the
Sea: Time to Join, http://www.globalsolutions.org/in_the_beltway/united_states_and_law_sea_time_join
(last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
100
David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber, The United States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty,
ASIL INSIGHTS (Am. Soc'y of Int'l L., D.C.) June 11, 2007, http://www.asil.org/insights070611.cfm.
101
Opponents refer to the Convention using the acronym “LOST” – Law of the Sea Treaty;
proponents prefer to highlight the Convention’s many benefits by referring to it as “LOTS.” Bellinger,
supra note 95.
102
Caron & Scheiber, supra note 100.
103
See supra § III.
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American jurisdiction.104
In addition, critics of the Convention argue that by ratifying the
Convention, the United States would set the wrong precedent by subjecting
itself to the authority of international organizations created by the
Convention, i.e., the ISA and the Commission.105 Because the decisionmaking process in these organizations usually requires a majority vote, the
United States would have to face “regional, economic, or political blocs that
coordinate their votes to support outcomes counter to U.S. interests.”106
However, if the United States ratifies the Convention, it would permit the
United States to nominate members for such bodies. As a result, the United
States would either have veto power or would have to get concurring votes
Moreover, having American
to prevent an adverse decision.107
representation in the bodies created by the Convention would ensure that the
Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with United
States’ interests.
Furthermore, critics claim that the Convention creates
“unaccountable international bureaucracies” susceptible to corruption.108
The ISA “is particularly pertinent considering that the Authority could
oversee significant resources through fees and charges on commercial
activities within its authority and potentially create a system of royalties and
104
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 28
(2003) (statement of Paul L. Kelly, Senior Vice President, Rowan Companies, Inc.), available at http://
foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/KellyTestimony031021.pdf.; see also BORGERSON, supra note 53, at
28 (arguing that “[b]y not joining, the United States is actually giving up sovereign rights—missing an
opportunity for international recognition for a massive expansion of U.S. resources jurisdiction over as
much as one million square kilometers of ocean, an area half the size of the Louisiana Purchase.”).
105
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 97. In its argument against the Convention
to Congress a representative of the American Mining noted the following:

It would create a government controlling an area that exceeds half the globe
with legislative powers and a huge bureaucracy able to approve or deny access to
seabed resources, dedicated to the principles of the New International Economic
Order, in “which the voting arrangements would reduce the voices of the United
States and other Western nations to bare whispers.
Id.
106

Edwin Meese, III, et al., The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Risks
Outweigh the Benefits 1, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, May 16, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/
InternationalOrganizations/upload/wm_1459.pdf (alleging that “[t]he bloc voting process is frequently
driven by the same overtly anti-American agenda that is often apparent in the U.N. General Assembly.”).
107
Part XI of UNCLOS states that, “[a]s a general rule, decision-making in the organs of the
Authority should be by consensus [,]” in nearly all cases, decisions may be adopted by a majority or twothirds vote of members present and voting “[i]f all efforts to reach a decision by consensus have been
exhausted . . . .” UN Office of Legal Affairs, Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Agreement
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindxAgree.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2009).
108
Meese et al., supra note 106, at 2 (alleging that “[w]hen international bureaucracies are
unaccountable they, like all unaccountable institutions, seek to insulate themselves from scrutiny and
become prone to corruption.”).
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profit sharing.”109 Although it is true that American companies interested in
the deep seabed mining beyond U.S. jurisdiction would have to pay an
application fee for the administrative expenses of processing the application,
any unused amount would be returned to them.110 Moreover, the United
States would have an absolute veto over the distribution of all revenues by
the Seabed Authority.111
The opponents also challenge the alleged benefits that the American
mining companies would receive by the United States’ participation in the
Convention.112 First, they argue that the Convention does not establish clear
procedures regarding the extension of property rights. In addition, the
Convention establishes that high seas are the “common heritage of
mankind.” This provision “leaves mining companies to question the full
extent of their property rights in the deep seabed areas.”113 To counter this
argument, it is enough to say that all major American companies interested
in deep seabed mining support the Convention.114
Finally, opponents of the Convention contend that accession is
basically unnecessary for the United States to enjoy the benefits of the
Convention: “[T]he United States remains free to define the parameters of
its acceptance of jurisdictional assertions by others consistent with its legal
rights and obligations, and is in a position to influence the development and
definition of customary international law.”115 However, as the following
section explores further, customary law is not universally accepted and is an
inadequate basis on which to support the United States’ claims to the Arctic.
In addition, most of the industrialized countries have joined the Convention,
and therefore it seems unlikely that they would be interested in developing a
customary law under United States leadership.116
C. The United States Does Not Have Viable Alternatives to the Convention
Capable of Securing Its Interest in the Arctic
One of the major flaws in the opponents’ arguments against
ratifying the Convention is the fact that they do not offer viable alternatives
to the Convention. The following section will consider customary
109

Id.
Myths About the Law of the Sea Convention, LAW OF THE SEA BRIEFING BOOK 15,
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/LOS-Briefing-Book.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
111
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, S. Doc. No. 108-10, at 95 (2d Sess. 2004).
112
Meese et al., supra note 103, at 2-3 (claiming that “[t]he marginal legal protections afforded to
mining companies by U.S. participation in UNCLOS are unlikely to change their calculations.”).
113
Id. at 3.
114
E.g., Telis Demos, The Great Arctic Circle Oil Rush, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Aug. 20, 2007, at 11
(Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Conoco Philips).
115
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 40.
116
Libya, Iran, Syria & North Korea have not ratified the Convention. Ratification Map, LAW OF
THE SEA BRIEFING BOOK 13, http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/LOS-Briefing-Book.pdf (last visited
Oct. 1, 2009).
110
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international law and a mini-treaty as alternatives to the Convention. It
concludes that customary international law does not secure all the benefits
of the Convention and does not provide for legal certainty to protect and
assert United States national security and economic rights in the Arctic. It
also concludes that calls for an Arctic mini-treaty are particularly misguided,
as the legal and other aspects of these two regions are vastly different.
1. Customary Law Is Not as Effective as the Convention in Protecting the
United States’ Interests in the Arctic
International customary laws have developed out of “concordant
practice by a number of states . . . over a considerable period of time,” when
such practice is thought to be required by, or consistent with, the prevailing
international law, and when such practice is generally accepted by other
states.117 As mentioned in section III, the Convention itself is based in part
on international customary laws. In addition, when an issue is not regulated
by the Convention, the customary laws serve a gap-filling role, and because
the Convention binds only its signatories, customary international law
remains an important means of transacting with non-signatories of the
Convention.118
However, the Convention expands the “existing norms to suit new
developments where the existing norms are no longer sufficient,” creates
new norms, and in some cases replaces old norms that are no longer
appropriate.119 Thus, asserting customary international law will not secure
all the benefits of the Convention for the United States because the
signatories of the Convention do not have to extend specific rights
established in the Convention, or those which are modifications of the
existing rules, to non-signatories.120 For example, Canada may choose not
to grant the United States the right of scientific research in the EEZ or in the
continental shelf.121
Furthermore, experts often disagree on the existing norms of
international law.122 The ambiguity exists because the international
customary law that applies to ocean activities is derived from numerous
conventions, judicial decisions, state practice, and interpretations by
international organizations. The customary law is not universally accepted,
117
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 104. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice refers to “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law . . . .” U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, § 1(b) (1945).
118
See generally CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 114.
119
Id. at 53.
120
Id. at 54.
121
Also, as a non-party, the U.S. does not have access to the Commission which is created by the
Convention not a customary law and cannot nominate nationals to sit on it. UNCLOS, supra note 3,
annex II, art. 2.
122
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 51.
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and it changes over time based on state practice.123 To obtain financing and
insurance and avoid litigation risk, “U.S. companies want the legal certainty
that would be secured through the Convention’s procedures in order to
engage in oil, gas, and mineral extraction on our extended continental
shelf.”124 Also, American companies may not use customary law to claim
the right to seabed mining. There is no customary practice for dealing with
seabed mining, and such practice is necessary for the formation of
customary law.125
Moreover, because it is so difficult to prove the extent of customary
law, according to some experts, “[a]bsent express agreement, mandatory
obedience to the decisions of international organizations or tribunals is for
all practical purposes out of the question.”126 The weaker the sense of
legitimacy, the less restrained state practice is likely to be. There is a
tendency among nations “to take treaty obligations more seriously than
customary law obligations,” which leads to increased self-restraint.127 As
Admiral Mullen testified when he was Vice Chief of Naval Operations, “[i]t
is too risky to continue relying upon unwritten customary international law
as the primary legal basis to support U.S. military operations.”128
2. A Mini-Treaty with Other Countries Is Unlikely
In addition to customary law, some scholars have proposed an
Arctic treaty modeled on the Antarctic Treaty System as an alternative to the
Convention.129 Such a treaty would provide a binding legal framework for
resolving overlapping continental shelf disputes in the Arctic.130
However, one of the effects of accepting the Convention is the ban
on the signatory states to “conclude or participate in any ‘mini-treaty’ with
other states, particularly with nonparties, whose purpose is clearly to
123

Bellinger, supra note 95.
Id.
125
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 55. Moreover, even if all countries would
agree with President Reagan that deep seabed mining was a high seas freedom, it would not provide a
better way than the Convention to secure investments. The application of a high seas freedom doctrine to
the deep seabed mining would merely “grant to everyone the right to jump everyone else’s claim.” Id. at
99.
126
Id. at 159.
127
Id. at 151.
128
S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 108-10, at 104 (2004).
129
See Holmes, supra note 54, at 347. But see Bellinger, supra note 95 (arguing that calls for a new
Arctic treaty along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty “are particularly misguided, as the legal, geographic,
and other aspects of these two regions are vastly different.”). The Antarctic is a large, isolated land mass
surrounded by water, whereas the Arctic is predominantly composed of the Arctic Ocean covered by an
ice cap. Erika Lennon, Comment, A Tale of Two Poles: A Comparative Look at the Legal Regimes in the
Arctic and the Antarctic, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 32, 32 (Spring 2008). More importantly,
unlike Antarctica, where most of the world does not recognize the sovereignty claims and a treaty served
to suspend the claims issue so as to permit scientific research, the land territory in the Arctic is almost
entirely undisputed. Bellinger, supra note 95.
130
Holmes, supra note 54, at 349.
124

Published by eCommons, 2009

168

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

conduct activities outside the scope of the Convention.”131 According to
Article 311(3) of the Convention, “parties shall not take actions prejudicial
to the implementation of the Convention as a whole.”132 Therefore, no party
may participate in an agreement with another party or nonparty that would
violate provisions of the Convention. Consequently, the United States may
not enter into an agreement with other Arctic nations that would divide the
Arctic Ocean because the Convention designates specific procedures that
must be followed by its members who wish to expand its sovereignty over
the Arctic Ocean.
Additionally, entering into a treaty with other countries in which
each country would recognize each other’s claim relating to deep seabed
development would be of dubious legal validity. Article 137(3) of the
Convention provides that “no state or natural or judicial person shall claim,
acquire or exercise rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the
Area except in accordance with this part. Otherwise, no such claim,
acquisition or exercise of such rights shall be recognized.”133 Thus, entering
into a treaty with other Arctic nations which have ratified the Convention
and upon which the Convention is binding would not assure the United
States access to mineral resources beneath the Arctic Ocean.134
Finally, the idea of a mini-treaty is not supported by the
governments of the five Arctic nations. Recently, representatives of the five
Arctic nations stated in the Ilulissat Declaration that “[w]e . . . see no need
to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the
Arctic Ocean.”135
D. The Convention Is the Best Way to Protect United States’ Interests in the
Arctic
The Convention has been described as the most comprehensive and
131

CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 54.
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Id. at 101.
134
According to one expert a license or permit issued outside the Convention “is a worthless piece
of paper which no commercial, publicly owned bank could use as a basis for extending credit since such
a license or permit would be in conflict with widely accepted international juridical proceedings.” Id. at
102. In 1984 some countries including the U.S. entered into an agreement that provided for procedures
to overlapping deep seabed mining claims. Holmes, supra note 54, at 350. Quickly, the Seabed
Authority rejected it on the grounds that it infringed in its exclusive authority to govern deep seabed
mining. Id.
135
Arctic Economics, The Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, http://benmuse.typepad.com/arctic_
economics/2008/05/the-ilulissak-declaration.html. The Ilulissat Declaration was announced on May 28,
2008 by five Arctic nations during the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat. Id. The key attendees
included Sergey Lavrov, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jonas Gahr Støre, Norwegian Minister for
Foreign Affairs; Gary Lunn, Canadian Minister for Natural Resources; and John Negroponte, American
Deputy Secretary of State; and Per Stig Møller, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Denmark, Denmark Hosts the Five Nations: Arctic Ocean Conference in Greenland, May 28,
2008, http://www.ambwashington.um.dk/en/menu/TheEmbassy/News/NewsArchive2008/
DenmarkHoststheFiveNationsArcticOceanConferenceInGreenland.htm.
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progressive protection for the oceans of any modern international accord.
According to President George Bush, the Convention
serve[s] the national security interests of the United States,
including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces
worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over
extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural
resources they contain. Accession will promote U.S.
interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it
will give the United States a seat at the table when the rights
that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.136
As noted by John D. Negroponte during testimony before the Senate
Committee, joining the Convention is “a win/win proposition” because the
United States does not have to change its laws, give up any rights, and will
only benefit in a variety of ways.137
1. The Convention Protects United States’ Economic Interests in the Arctic
The Convention would codify the United States’ sovereignty rights
over all the resources in the ocean, and on and under the ocean floor, in a
200-nautical mile EEZ off its coastline.138 Because the United States has
one of the longest coastlines and the largest EEZ of all the countries in the
world, it could gain significantly from these provisions.139
The Convention also gives the United States an opportunity to
expand its sovereignty rights over resources on and under the ocean floor
beyond 200 nautical miles to the end of its continental shelf, up to 350
nautical miles.140 This mechanism is especially valuable to the United
States as it would maximize legal certainty regarding the United States’
rights to energy resources in large offshore areas, including the areas of the
Arctic Ocean. However, the United States must ratify the Convention for its
claims to be internationally recognized.141 Not surprisingly, the American
oil companies favor ratification, as it will allow them to explore oceans
136
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Negroponte, supra note 94, at 4.
S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 108-10, at 117-18.
139
Id. at 117. The Convention would bring an additional 4.1 million square miles of ocean under
the United States jurisdiction; an area bigger than the United States land area. Id. at 118.
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Id. at 117. This “favors the U.S. as one of the few nations with broad continental margins,
particularly in the North Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Id. at 118. The
U.S. “extended continental shelf is estimated to be the size of two Californias.” Bellinger, supra note 95.
141
In the statement issued on March 10, 1983, President Reagan argued that seabed mining should
be viewed as a freedom of the high seas and as such it shall be “open to all nations.” Policy Statement,
supra note 83. In addition, the President noted that the U.S. “will continue to allow its firms to explore
for and, when the market permits, exploit these resources.” Id. In response to Reagan’s statement,
Tommy Koh (the second president of the third United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea) said
that he will ensure that a challenge is brought to the International Court of Justice should U.S. attempt to
exploit the seabed resources outside the Convention’s rule. CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra
note 62, at 24, 101.
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beyond 200 miles off the coast, where evolving technologies now make oil
and natural gas recoverable.142
If the United States ratifies the Convention it could expand its areas
for mineral exploration and production by more than 291,383 square
miles.143 The United States’ claim under article 76 would add an area in the
Arctic (Chukchi Cap) roughly equal to the area of West Virginia.144 With a
successful claim the United States would have the sole right to the
exploitation of all the resources on and under the Arctic Ocean bottom.
These potential energy resources could make significant contributions to
United States energy independence. Because the Convention is the only
means of assuring access to the mineral resources beneath the Arctic Ocean,
American companies “wishing to engage in deep seabed mining operations
will have no choice but to proceed under the flag of a country that has
adhered to the treaty.”145
In addition, as discussed in section I, the Commission will soon
begin making decisions on the claims to the continental shelf in the Arctic
Ocean that could affect the United States’ own claim. For example the
United States is unable to comment on Russia’s claim to the Arctic Ocean.
In order to challenge the Commission’s finding the United States must be a
member of the Convention.146
With the recent energy crisis, it is rather surprising that more
Americans are not demanding that the United States join the Convention and
catch up with the other Arctic nations in exploring and securing its extended
continental shelf. Although the United States may decide to refrain from
exploiting its continental shelf resources, it seems hard to imagine why it
would not want to maximize its potential ability to do so by ratifying the
Convention and by joining the other Arctic nations in pursuit of its own
claim to the Arctic Ocean.
2. The Convention Protects the United States National Security Interest in
the Arctic
The opening of the Arctic Ocean could become a source of new
drilling, shipping, fishing, and other opportunities to the United States.
142
See supra note 114. Offshore oil and natural gas is the world’s biggest marine industry; oil
production can have value of more than 300 billion per year. See S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 108-10, at 118.
143
S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 108-10, at 119.
144
Id. at 162.
145
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 62, at 103.
146
Senator Lugar noted that the Commission will soon start making decisions on claims to
continental shelf areas “that could impact the United States’ own claims to the area and resources of our
broad continental margin. Russia is already making excessive claims in the Arctic. Unless we are party
to the Convention, we will not be able to protect our national interest in these discussions.” Sen. Richard
G. Lugar, The Law of the Sea Convention: The Case for Senate Action, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
May 4, 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20040504lugar.htm.
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However, with more open and accessible waters, the long and unprotected
border in the Arctic could also become a potential terrorist and drug
trafficking entry. In order to protect the United States’ security interests in
the Arctic and worldwide, the United States’ armed forces must be able to
navigate freely on, over, and under the oceans.
The Convention preserves key rights of navigation and overflight.
According to Deputy Secretary of Defense John D. Negroponte, the
Convention provides for a “legal framework . . . [which] is essential to the
mission of the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland
Security . . . .”147 The Convention grants American ships the right of
innocent passage, allowing ships transit through the territorial seas of
foreign countries without having to provide advance notice or request
permission.
Moreover, the Convention establishes the right of transit passage
through international straits such as the Straits of Singapore and Malacca or
the Strait of Gibraltar. This right, which is absolutely critical to U.S.
national security, may not be suspended, hampered, or infringed upon by
coastal States.148 Also, the Convention creates the Archipelagic sea lanes
passage that allows transit through routes in archipelagic states, such as
Indonesia.149 Additionally, the provisions creating EEZ give the American
military “the ability to position, patrol, and operate forces freely in, below,
and above those littoral waters.”150
Finally, the Convention secures the right of American warships to
operate on the high seas, “which is a critically important element of
maritime security operations, counter-narcotic operations, and antiproliferation efforts.”151 The Convention’s navigational rights led to its
support by all branches of the military: Secretary Gates, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Military Department Secretaries, all of the Combatant
Commanders, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard.152
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WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GORDON ENGLAND BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, ACCESSION TO THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND
RATIFICATION OF THE 1994 AGREEMENT PART XI OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 1 (2007),
http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/EnglandTestimony070927.pdf.
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John D. Negroponte & Gordon England, Reap the Bounty, WASH. TIMES, June 13, 2007, at A17.
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they allow to “move vast quantities of war materiel [sic] through the Straits . . . .” STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL PATRICK M. WALSH, U.S NAVY VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HEARING ON THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 4 (2007),
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2007/WalshTestimony070927.pdf.
150
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3. The Convention Could Help the United States to Enforce Its Rights in the
Arctic Through Peaceful Dispute Settlement
Numerous legal experts believe that the U.S. interests in a clear and
stable law of the sea are reinforced by “the comprehensive compulsory
dispute settlement provisions in the Convention.”153 When nations disagree
on boundaries, mineral claims, or other aspects of the Convention, the
Convention contains a unique dispute resolution mechanism that obligates
nations to settle their differences peacefully through one of four methods.
The dispute mechanism is “flexible, in that Parties have options as
to how and in what fora they will settle their disputes, and comprehensive,
in that most of the Convention’s rules can be enforced through binding
dispute resolution.”154 For example, the Convention allows a member to
choose arbitration tribunals and does not require any disputes to go to the
International Court of Justice. Consequently, the United States, as part of its
accession or anytime thereafter, would have the legal right to choose among
the following adjudicating bodies:
The International Tribunal for The Law of the Sea, a
standing tribunal of twenty-one judges, each from different
nations, that serve nine year terms;
The International Court of Justice, a United Nations court of
fifteen judges appointed by the General Assembly and
Security Council;
A special arbitration tribunal under Annex VII made up of
environmental, marine science, navigation, and fisheries
experts, of which the United States would pick two to five
arbitrators;
A special arbitration panel under Annex VII composed of
five members of whom the United States would be allowed
to choose one and be involved in the appointment of at least
three others.155
The Convention also allows the parties to exclude some of the
sensitive categories of the disputes, such as military activities, from the
156
binding dispute settlement procedures.
153
Marjorie Ann Browne, The Law of the Sea Convention and U.S. Policy, CONG. RES. SERVICE,
May 12, 2006, at 5, available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8927:1.
154
S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 108-10, at 69.
155
Raphael Sagarin et al., Balancing U.S. Interests in the UN Law of the Sea Convention,
NICHOLAS INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SOLUTIONS 5-6, Oct. 2007, http://www.nicholas.
duke.edu/institute/lawofsea.pdf. The U.S. has indicated its preference for adjudicating conflicts under
the last two options, using the third option for fisheries, environmental and navigational disputes, and the
fourth option for other disputes. Id. at 6.
156
Id. at 2-3, 6.
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Finally, the Convention would provide the United States with a
clear and internationally recognized pathway for making and disputing
claims to Arctic resources. The United States could at last catch up with
other Arctic nations and prepare its own claim to the Commission. Of
course, the Convention’s dispute settlement provisions do not guarantee that
the United States would win every dispute, but “not joining the Convention
presents a far greater risk: that the United States will be left without solid
legal protections for its vital national security, economic, and environmental
interests.”157
CONCLUSION
As the global climate is warming up rapidly, leading to ice-free
summers in the Arctic Ocean, Arctic nations are confronting the prospect of
new rights over the Arctic’s vast natural resources. All Arctic nations—
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia—except for the United States, ratified
the Convention and have already submitted, or are preparing to submit,
proposed limits for their extended continental shelves to the Commission.
The submissions will enable these countries to obtain international
recognition over their extended continental shelves in the Arctic, including
exclusive rights over oil and gas reserves.
As a nation with an extensive coastline and a continental shelf with
enormous oil and gas reserves, the United States has much more to gain than
lose from joining the Convention. Furthermore, the uncertainties stemming
from the customary law make it a less effective measure to protect
American interests. Only a universal regime such as the Convention can
adequately safeguard the United States’ interest in the Arctic Ocean. The
best way to guarantee access to the Arctic’s resources is for the United
States to become a party to the Convention.
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